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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

The issue of whether defendant's military

retirement pension is marital property subject to division
is not properly before the Court, since it was not raised in
the lower court proceedings.
2.

If this issue is properly before the Court, then

the defendant's military retirement pension is marital
property subject to division in Utah.
3.

The Trial Court's clarification or interpretation

of the decree did not amount to a modification.

STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter is before the Court following the Trial
Court's denial of defendant-appellant's motion seeking
termination of payments to plaintiff-respondent under the
Uniformed Services Former Spouse Protection Act (10 U.S.C.
Section 1408).

The appellant-husband requested that the

Trial Court interpret the division of his retirement pay in
the decree as alimony, while plaintiff-respondent took the
position that the division of appellant's military
retirement pay was a division of property, not an award of
alimony.

The District Court concluded that the division of

appellant's retirement pay in the Decree of Divorce had been
a division of marital property and not an award of alimony,
and denied appellant's request.

-1(c)-

At this point/ respondent would point out that
appellant1s Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts are
misleading, erroneous, and argumentative.

Respondent

submits that it is improper for a litigant appearing before
this Court to make factual assertions which are not
supported by the record and, further, that this Court need
not, and should not, consider any facts not properly cited
to or supported by the record.

See Golden Key Realty vs.

Mantas, 699 P.2d 730 (Utah, 1985); Uckerman vs. Lincoln
National Life, 588 P.2d 142 (Utah, 1978).
In his Statement of the Case, appellant states that the
parties stipulated and agreed prior to the divorce that
appellant's military retirement income was not subject to
division as marital property, but was a source of income to
be used in determining the amount and securing the payment
of spousal and child support.

In fact, the parties entered

into a written Stipulation and Agreement which says no such
thing. (R., 4 and 6 ) .
The Stipulation was incorporated into the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law (R., 10), and the Decree of
Divorce (R., 12-15).
Appellant next asserts that the treatment of the
military retirement pay as alimony was reaffirmed in a
subsequent Order on Order to Show Cause (R., 33), when in
fact the Court in that Order specifically reaffirmed that
the alimony payment was $490.00 per month, which makes it
entirely separate from the military retirement pay (R., 34).
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Appellant next states that the Court amended the Decree
of Divorce to designate defendant's military retirement
income as marital property and denied appellant's motion to
terminate monthly payments from his retirement income. In
fact/ the Court ruled that defendant's military pension had
been divided between the parties as property (R., 87; R.,
84).

The only modification made by the Court in the Order

appealed from was to change the designation of respondent's
share qf the military pension to one-half of the disposable
or net retirement pay instead of one-half of the gross
retirement pay.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's Statement of Facts, as with his Statement
of the Case, is inaccurate, incorrect, and misrepresents a
great deal of material which is not part of the record.

For

example, appellant refers to his "long and distinguished"
Air Force career (nothing in the record); appellant's
statement that Paragraph 8 of the Decree of Divorce
specified $1,370.00 per month spousal support (a blatant
misstatement, see R., 4-7); the statement that this amount
was "specifically intended by the parties to cover
plaintiff's anticipated monthly expenses" (nothing in the
record, this is merely appellant's fanciful version);
references to the parties discussions and negotiations (not
part of the record); defendant reporting deductions from his
retirement pay as alimony (nothing in the record, in fact,
respondent did not report them as income, although that is
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not part of the record either); a reference in the middle of
Page 5 of his brief to the fact that the parties "still
regard defendant's military retirement pay as income" (a
misstatement unsupported in the record); a reference that,
following the 1984 hearing, the Court left the "spousal
support obligation unchanged" an

"reaffirmed that the

military retired pay was being treated as income, not
property" (the Order speaks for itself, R., 31-34).

The

Statement of Facts is replete with other factual errors and
misstatements in addition to those noted above.

Respondent

would again request the Court to apply the doctrines
enunciated in Golden Key and Uckerman, supra, and ignore any
of appellant's "facts" which are not supported by the
record.

Respondent submits the following Statement of

Facts.

RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties were married in 1956, the same year
defendant began his career in the United States Air Force.
Two children were born of the marriage, one of whom is
mentally handicapped and, at the f^ime of the hearing from
which this appeal arises, was still dependent upon parental
support.

Defendant subsequently retired from the U.S. Air

Force in 1976, and began receiving his military retirement
pension in approximately 1976.
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In May 1983, respondent (hereinafter referred to as
plaintiff) filed a complaint for divorce through her
previous attorney.

Plaintiff and appellant (hereinafter

referred to as defendant) executed a Stipulation and
Agreement dated May 13, 1983 (R., 4-8). The critical part
of that stipulation for this appeal ,is contained in
Paragraph 8 thereof, as follows:
/

"Defendant agrees to pay, pursuant to 10 USC section
1408, of the Uniform Services Former Spouses Protection Act,
1/2 of USAF retired gross pay, 1/2 of which at present is
$880, plus $490 alimony, plus $150 child support for Robert
Jr. each per month. Said sums will be deposited to a bank
account in the name of the Plaintiff. The amount of alimony
may be renegotiated annually, by agreement if possible, or
by court order if agreement is not possible, and there has
been a substantial change in circumstances. If Robert Jr
should become employed full time and/or become self
supporting, child support payments shall cease. Defendant
and Plaintiff may be ordered to supply such financial
records as necessary at time of any renegotiations to
substantiate any claims for adjustment of alimony or child
support.w
On June 28, 1983, plaintiff appeared with her
then-attorney, presented the Stipulation to the Court, and
the Court ordered that the terms of the divorce were to be
as set forth in the Stipulation, with those terms to be
incorporated into the Findings and Decree (R., 9). The
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law provided that the
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Decree should incorporate all matters stated in the
Stipulation (R., 10 & 11), and a Decree of Divorce was
entered on July 8# 1983, incorporating the terms of the
Stipulation.

Paragraph 8 of the Stipulation also appears,

verbatim/ as Paragraph 8 of the Decree (R., 15).
In February 1984, defendant filed an Affidavit and
obtained an Order to Show Cause seeking modification
regarding some insurance policies, child support, and
alimony (See Affidavit of Defendant* R., 17-19).
Plaintiff filed a Response and Counter-Affidavit (R.,
21-25), seeking, among other things, to have her half of
defendant's retirement pay paid to her directly from the Air
Force.

An Order was subsequently entered on February 28,

1984 (R., 31-34).

In that Order, the Trial Judge dealt with

the retirement pay in Paragraph 10, and dealt separately
with the alimony in Paragraph 12.

In the said Paragraph 12

(R., 34), the Court refused to change the alimony, finding
that the defendant remained able to "pay the full alimony
ordered in the Decree of Divorce", stating that "the
defendant shall continue to pay the sum of Four Hundred
Ninety Dollars ($490) per month alimony to the plaintiff".
This Order was not appealed.
Thereafter, in November 1985, defendant filed a Motion
with the Court seeking termination of alimony "to include
that portion being withheld from his retired pay", and
further seeking termination of the requirement that
defendant maintain the plaintiff as beneficiary under some
life insurance policies.

(R., 47-48).
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Plaintiff responded to the Motion, admitting her
remarriage and admitting that alimony in the sum of $490 per
month should be terminated, although affirmatively alleging
that defendant was at that time several thousand dollars
behind in his alimony payments, and further pointing out
that alimony and the division of defendant's military
retirement pay had absolutely nothing to do with one
another.

(R., 51-52).

Since the defendant had taken the liberty to submit an
Order to the Court terminating plaintiff's interest in
defendant's military retirement pay, an objection to that
Order and a Request for Hearing were also filed (R., 53),
and plaintiff also filed her Affidavit in Support of Order
to Show Cause and Order to Show Cause (R., 57-61).
Defendant's Motion and plaintiff's Order to Show Cause
were consolidated for hearing, and the plaintiff filed a
request that the Honorable VeNoy Christofferson hear the
matters since he had heard the original Decree of Divorce
and the previous Order to Show Cause. (R., 60).
The consolidated matters were heard on May 22, 1986,
and a full transcript of that hearing is included with the
record.

At the hearing, both parties argued the matters

before the Court, and although plaintiff offered to present
testimony, the Court declined to hear any, stating as
follows:
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"I think from what I've seen that I can go on what your
documents and orders and prior pleadings and decree are."
(T., 33, lines 11-13).
The parties and the Court had some further discussion
concerning the Court deciding the matter on the record
rather than taking testimony (T., 33-34), with the Court
ultimately concluding that if he ran into a problem he felt
was important enough then he would reopen the case and hear
testimony (T., 34,

lines 14-17).

The Court entered a Memorandum Decision without
requesting or hearing any testimony (R., 72-74)/ followed by
an Order (R./ 83-84)/ and Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law (R./ 85-90).
The Order awarded judgment to the plaintiff for alimony
arrearages calculated at the rate of $490 per month (R.#
77)/ ruled that the division of defendant's military
retirement pay "has been and shall be considered as a
division of property, and is not and was not alimony" (R./
84).

The Order further amended the Decree of Divorce to

provide that plaintiff's share of defendant's military
retirement pay should be one-half of his disposable or net
retirement, instead of one-half of his gross retirement (R.#
84)/ in order to comply with the provisions of 10 U.S.C.,
Section 1408.
Defendant appeals from those parts of the Order dealing
with the military retirement pay.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

POINT I

DEFENDANT'S ISSUE CONCERNING WHETHER MILITARY
RETIREMENT PAY IS MARITAL PROPERTY SUBJECT TO
DIVISION WAS NOT RAISED BELOW AND CANNOT BE RAISED
FOR THE FIRST TIME BEFORE THIS COURT.
POINT II
EVEN IF THIS COURT CHOOSES TO REVIEW THE ISSUE OF
MILITARY RETIREMENT PAY, IT SHOULD BE TREATED AS
MARITAL PROPERTY SUBJECT TO DIVISION IN A DIVORCE.
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY INTERPRETED IT'S OWN
DECREE, FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT'S RETIREMENT
PAY WAS DIVIDED AS MARITAL PROPERTY AND NOT AS
ALIMONY.
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ARGUMENT

POINT I

THE ISSUE OF WHETHER DEFENDANT'S MILITARY RETIREMENT
PAY MAY BE TREATED AS MARITAL PROPERTY IS RAISED
FOR THE FIRST TIME UPON APPEAL AND THEREFORE IS NOT
PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT.
On appeal/ for the first time, defendant attempts to
raise the issue of whether or not military retirement pay
may be treated in the same fashion under Utah law as other
types of retirement pay.

This issue has never been raised

at any time before the Trial Court in this matter, and
certainly was not raised in the hearing or in the Order
being appealed.
In fact, the issue was stipulated to by the parties in
their initial Stipulation.

In that original agreement (R.,

4-7), the parties specifically refer to 10 U.S.C, Section
1408, entitled the Uniformed Services Former Spouses
Protection Act, and specifically divided the defendant's
retirement pay half to the plaintiff and half to the
defendant.

In his Motion, defendant did not raise the issue

of whether or not the military retirement pay was subject to
being divided; rather, the thrust of the Motion was that the
agreed-upon division should be construed as alimony rather
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than property.

At the hearing on May 22, the defendant's

argument had nothing to do with whether or not the Court had
authority to divide the military retirement pay.

In fact/

defendant specifically stated/ in his argument/ that the
Court did have the right to divide military retirement pay
as marital property, stating in his argument as follows:
"Now, had that been intended as a property settlement
award, which under the statute which I will get to shortly
can be done, then it would have normally appeared as a
separate, distinct award of property. It was not done that
way." (T./ 4/ lines 21-25).
Mr. Richardson further stated:
"The public law involved is the Former Spouses
Protection Act and I would ask the Court to take judicial
notice of it. Here is a copy of it. And initally on Page 1
you will find that support can be awarded from this as child
support/ alimony, and/or as a division of property. Any of
the three can be done." (T./5f lines 9-14).
Defendant's entire argument below was to the effect
that the division of his retirement pay was intended as
spousal support and not as property.

Not once in these

entire proceedings has the defendant ever raised the issue
now raised on appeal in his Point I.
The well-established and often cited rule of this Court
is that matters not presented at hearing or trial in the
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lower court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
See Bundy vs. Century Equipment/ 692 P.2d 754 (Utah/ 1984);
Trayner vs. Cushinq# 688 P.2d 856 (Utah/ 1984); Banqerter
vs. Poulton/ 663 P.2d 100 (Utah, 1983); Park City Utah
Corporation vs. Ensign Company/ 586 P.2d 446 (Utah, 1978).

POINT II
IF THE COURT HEARS THE ISSUE OF WHETHER MILITARY
RETIREMENT PAY IS MARITAL PROPERTY/ THE COURT
SHOULD TREAT MILITARY RETIREMENT PAY AS IT DOES
OTHER TYPES OF RETIREMENT PAY.
Utah law specifically provides for the equitable
division of retirement pay# and military retirement pay
should not be treated any differently.
In the case of Woodward vs. Woodward/ 656 P.2d 431
(Utah), this Court carefully and thoroughly considered the
issue of retirement pay and how it should be treated in
divorce actions under Utah law.

In partially overruling the

earlier case of Bennett vs. Bennett/ 607 P.2d 839 (Utah,
1980)/ and upholding the Trial Court's award of a portion of
the husband's retirement to the wife, the Court stated as
follows:
"The wife urges the adoption of the position taken by
the California Supreme ' mrt in In re Marriage of Brown/ 15
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Cal.3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal.Rptr. 633 (1976). There
the court held that "[p]ension rights, whether or not
vested, represent a property interest; to the extent that
such rights derive from employment during coverture, they
comprise a community asset subject to division in a
dissolution proceeding,M Id. at 562-63, 126 Cal.Rptr. at
634-35. This case overruled an earlier California case of
long standing which had distinguished pension rights on the
basis of whether the rights had vested. In the context of
Utah law, we find it unnecessary to consider whether or not
the pension rights are "vested or non-vested." In Enqlert
vs. Enqlert, Utah, 576 P.2d 1274 (1978), we emphasized the
equitable nature of proceedings dealing with the family,
pointing out that the Court may take into consideration all
of the pertinent circumstances. These circumstances
encompass "all of the assets of every nature possessed by
the parties, whenever obtained and from whatever source
derived; and that this includes any such pension fund or
insurance." (Woodward, Page 432).
This Court continued, in referring to pension rights,
as follows:
"If the rights to those benefits are acquired during
the marriage, then the Court must at least consider those
benefits in making an equitable distribution of the marital
assets. 'The right to receive monies in the future is
unquestionably...an economic resource1 subject to equitable
distribution based upon proper computation of its present
dollar value." (Citations omitted). Whether that resource
is subject to distribution does not turn on whether the
spouse can presently use or control it, or on whether the
resource can be given a present dollar value. The essential
criterion is whether a right to the benefit or asset has
accrued in whole or in part during the marriage. To the
extent that the right has so accrued it is subject to
equitable distribution." (Woodward, Page 432-433).
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Defendant argues that this Court has never addressed
the specific issue of whether or not military retirement pay
is subject to division upon the dissolution of a marriage*
It is respectfully submitted that the issue was decided in
Woodward,
As this Court stated in Woodward, Utah uses a very
broad, equitable approach in proceedings dealing with the
family and the division of assets in a divorce case.

As

noted above, this includes all of the assets of every nature
possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from
whatever source derived.
Equity focuses upon the substance of a transaction
rather than its form, as this Court did in the Woodward
case.
In the case of Linson vs. Linson, 618 P.2d 748 (Hawaii), the
Hawaii Appeals Court considered the issue
retirement pensions.

f military

In ruling that a spouse's non-vested
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military retirement benefit constituted a part of the estate
of the parties for purposes of division in a divorce
proceeding, the Court considered and reviewed cases from
several jurisdictions, some holding that military retirement
benefits were not divisible property, and some holding that
they were.

The Hawaii Court stated;

"In reading the opinions of courts which have passed on
this issue we come to the conclusion that those courts which
hold that nonvested retirement benefits are cognizable or
divisible do so on the basis of equity, although this is
sometimes left unsaid. Courts holding that such benefits
are not cognizable or divisible, on the other hand, appear
not to have considered equity at all, but to have rather
mechanically applied rules of property law." (Linson, P
750-751).
Defendant cites the Court to the case of Slaughter vs.
Slaughter, 421 P.2d 503 (Utah, 1966), in support of his
position that military retired pay is governed by an
entirely different set of legal principles and policies.

In

fact, Slaughter is a per curium opinion which does not even
remotely discuss the issue of retirement pay.

The Court

simply noted in that case that the defendant received
military retirement pay, was a retired colonel, and then
upheld the Trial Court with absolutely no discussion of any
af the issues in the case.
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Defendant next provides the Court with a lengthy
discussion of a series of U.S.

Supreme Court cases,

culminating in the recent case of McCarty vs. McCarty.
Defendant correctly states the holding and reasoning of the
McCarty case, but incorrectly urges the Court to adopt it as
current law.
The McCarty case, and everything it stands for, was
promptly rejected and overturned by Congress through the
enactment of Title 10 U.S.C. Section 1408, commonly referred
to as the Uniformed Services Former Spouse Protection Act.
A copy of this Act is attached to defendant's brief. In
fact, Congress specifically mads this act retroactive to the
date of the McCarty decision (June 25, 1981) specifically to
avoid the harsh and inequitable effect of the McCarty case
upon divorced spouses of military personnel (Smith vs.
Smith, 458 A.2d 711 (Delaware, 1983)).

While it is true

that each individual state may reach its own decision as to
whether military retirement pay is a marital asset subject
to being divided, it is difficult to see how this Court, in
view of the Woodward decision, could equitably treat
military retirement pay differently than any other type of
retirement pay.
Defendant argues to the Court that the "vast majority"
of common law jurisdictions continue to follow the
principles enunciated in the McCarty case, holding that
military retirement pay is not subject to division in a
divorce action.

In support of this contention defendant
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cites several cases decided prior to the enactment of the
Uniformed Services Former Spouse Protection Act. At this
time state courts did not have the option of deciding
whether military retirement pensions could be divided,
because several cases prior to the McCarty case had been
fairly consistent in holding that the states could not
interfere with military retirement pensions.
Defendant cites cases from six jurisdictions, including
Alaska, which have been decided subsequent to the Uniformed
Services Former Spouses Protection Act.

In fact, Alaska has

now decided that military pensions are divisible property
(See Chase vs. Chase, 662 P.2d 944 (Alaska, 1983)).
As defendant recites in his brief, the community
property states (8 of them) typically treat military
retirement pay as a community asset and divide it between
the parties.
The following jurisdictions have held that military
retirement pay is property subject to division in a divorce
proceeding:

Alaska - Chase vs. Chase (Supra); Arizona -

Czarnecki vs. Czarnecki, 600 P.2d 1098 (1979); California In re Marriage of Stenquist, 582 P.2d 96 (1978); Hawaii Linson vs. Linson, 618 P.2d 748 (1980); Idaho - Lang vs.
Lang, 711 P.2d 1322 (1985); Montana - In re Marriage of
Kecskes, 683 P.2d 478 (1984); New Mexico - Waltenkowski vs.
Waltenkowski, 672 P.2d 657 (1983); Oregon - Matter of
Marriage of Wood, 676 P.2d 338 (1984); Washington - In re
Marriage of Landry, 699 P.2d 214 (1985); New Jersey -
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Castiglioni vs. Castiglioni, 471 A.2d 809 (1984); Iowa - In
re Marriage of Schissel, 292, NW.2d 421 (1980); Missouri Coates vs. Coates, 650 SW.2d 307 (1983); Texas - Voronin vs.
Voronin, 662 SW.2d 102 (1983); Illinois - re Marriage of
Dooley, 484 NE.2d 894 (1985); Louisiana - Allen vs. Allen,
484 So.2d 269 (1986).
In summary, there is no logical reason to treat
military retirement pay any differently than other type of
retirement pay.

Utah uses an equitable approach in divorce

proceedings, and there certainly is no equitable reason for
military retirement pay to be handled differently.

At one

time, there was indeed a legal reason, to wit, the McCarty
case and its predecessors.

Under those cases, states were

forbidden from dividing military retirement pay.

However,

the McCarty case was quickly, thoroughly and soundly
overruled by Congress and there is no longer any legal
reason for treating military retirement pay differently.
Defendant's argument that all distinctions between
income and marital property would be lost if military
retirement pay is to be classified as "property" was
rejected by this very Court in Woodward.
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POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT MODIFY THE DECREE TO CLASSIFY
DEFENDANT'S MILITARY RETIREMENT PAY AS MARITAL
PROPERTY AND THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION,
Defendant argues to the Court that the Court

modified

the Decree of Divorce to classify the defendant's income as
marital property.
A cursory examination of the record shows that this is
not what happened in the lower court.
The parties entered into a Stipulation (R., 4-8), which
in turn was incorporated into the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law (R., 10-11), and the Decree of Divorce
(R., 12-15).

No appeal was taken from the Decree.

Thereafter/ in February 1984, defendant initiated a
hearing on an Order to Show Cause in an attempt to lower or
terminate the alimony he was paying to the plaintiff.
Plaintiff responded, a hearing was held, and an Order was
entered (R., 31-34).

As is evident from the record, that

entire proceeding occurred with no mention of defendant's
new-found theory that the division of his retirement pay was
alimony, not property.

In fact, it is clear from the Order

entered in that February 1984 proceeding that alimony was
considered to be $490 per month, child support was
considered to be $150 per month, leaving the division of
retirement pay as property.
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The record reflects substantial communication between
the parties and their attorneys thereafter (R., 35-44),
including two separate stipulations, neither of which deal
in any way with the issue of retirement pay.
In November 1985, for the first time, defendant raised
the issue of his retirement pay, by filing a Motion seeking
the termination of alimony, ,ftc include that portion being
withheld from his retirement pay".

J(R., 47). Other matters

were raised in that Motion and in plaintiff's response, none
of which are appealed.
The Trial Court was called upon to interpret its
Decree, not modify the same.

Neither party requested nor

presented evidence in support of modification regarding the
issue of retirement pay.
It should be noted at this juncture that if this Court
feels that defendant's Motion could or should be interpreted
as a request for modification, then the defendant failed to
prove the necessary compelling reasons to modify as required
by this Court in Foulqer vs. Foulger, 626 P.2d 412 (Utah,
1981), which is quoted by the defendant in his brief. Also,
see Land vs. Land, 605 P. 2d 124*\ (Utah, 1980), and Despain
vs. Despain, 610 P.2d 1303 (Utah, 1980), both quoted md
referred to in defendar

brief.

If defendant's Motion is

so interpreted, then dex adant failed in his proof, did not
meet the appropriate standard, and his appeal should be
dismissed.
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On the other hand, from the record it would appear that
the parties and

the Trial Court viewed the issue of

retirement pay as one of interpreting the decree.

Following

that theory, the Trial Court heard argument from the
parties, but did not invite or accept any testimony or new
evidence, stating that the matter could be decided from the
Stipulation, Decree, and on the record itself (T., 33-34).
As this Court has stated many times, the standard of
review in divorce proceedings is that this Court will not
disturb a Trial Court's findings and orders absent an abuse
of discretion.

See Wiese vs. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700 (Utah,

1985); Fletcher vs. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah, 1980);
Lord vs. Shaw, 682 P.2d 853 (Utah, 1984) - (absent an abuse
of discretion, the Supreme Court will not substitute its
judgment for that of the Trial Court).
The situation presented to this Court is one of a Trial
Court interpreting its own Decree, and finding that the
initial Decree had divided defendant's military retirement
pay as property.

Given the advantaged position of the Trial

Court and the standard applied to such matters (noted above)
this Court should not overturn the Trial Judge's
interpretation.
The only amendment the Court made to the Decree was to
change the division between the parties from one-half of
gross to one-half of net.

As was pointed out in the

argument of both parties at the hearing (T., 20-22), the
award in the Decree of one-half of the gross retired pay
exceeded the amount allowed by Congress in 10 U.S.C. 1408.
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Both parties agreed that the Decree should read "net" rather
than "gross" (T.f 20/ lines 6-7).
In addition, the parties at the hearing in effect
stipulated to the amendment changing "gross" to "net".

On

Pages 34, 35 and 36 of the transcript/ the parties and the
Court enter into a discussion concerning how to calculate
the alimony arrearage.

The discussion centered around

whether or not Mr. Greene had overpaid plaintiff her portion
of his pension during a time period when he was still
receiving a full pension and then turning half of it over to
her.

Defendant's attorney indicated that the parties could

"stipulate to what those figures are once we get his (the
Court's) ruling.

You have the numbers and I do. We should

be able to work it out. We don't know what they are."
(T./ 34-35).
Also see Page 35 of the transcript/ lines 4 through 10
and Page 36 of the transcript/ lines 12-25.
Thus, there was agreement between the parties to modify
the Decree so that the division of defendant's retirement
pay was based upon his net retirement pay rather than his
gross retirement pay.
During the hearing, it became apparent to the Court and
all parties that it was necessary to amend or modify the
Decree to provide for a division of fhe retirement pay on a
net basis rather than a gross basis.
Decree accordingly.

The Court modified the

.V though the Court did not specifically

make any findings or statement concerning the basis of its
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authority to do so, it is apparent that the Court may modify
its own Decree.

In addition, Section 30-4a-l of the Utah

Code provides that the Court may enter nunc pro tunc orders
in divorce cases.

Although the Court in this case did not

base its modification or change upon this statutory
authority, it is respectfully submitted that the Court could
have done so.
Also, Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides for correcting or altering judgments for various
reasons.

Subdivision 5 of that rule provides that a final

judgment may be altered if the judgment is void, while
Subdivision 7 provides that a final judgment may be altered
for any other reason justifying relief from the operation of
the judgment.
Although this particular section was not invoked by the
Court or any of the parties in the proceeding below, it
would appear that the portion of the judgment granting
one-half of the defendant's gross pay to plaintiff was
either void or beyond the jurisdiction of the Court, and
could be corrected pursuant Subdivision 5 or Subdivision 7
of Rule 60(b) to read net pay.
In his brief, defendant argues that the Stipulation
should be construed strictly against the plaintiff, since
the attorney representing her prepared the Stipulation and
presented it to the Court.

This same argument was presented

by the defendant at the hearing.

While that type of

reasoning may be accurate when parties are litigating a
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contract^ it is not applicable in this case.

The parties

here are asking the Court to interpret a Decree of Divorce/
not a stipulation.

The Decree was entered by the Court, and

the Court certainly has the authority to interpret it when
presented directly with the issue.
Defendant further argues that "plaintiff must not be
permitted to obtain a property interest in defendant's
military retired pay three (3) years after she relinquished
all such interest."

(Appellant's brief, page 25).

Plaintiff made no such relinquishment, and it is clear that
the Court interpreted the Decree, and made no amendment
granting the plaintiff a property interest.

The only

amendment made was to correct an obvious error, to wit, the
granting of one-half the gross pay rather than one-half of
the net.

-24-

CONCLUSION
Defendant's contention that military retirement pay
should not be divisible under Utah law is improperly raised
for the first time on appeal.

Even if this Court considers

the issue, the Woodward case clearly applies and the
retirement pay was properly divided.

The lower court

correctly interpreted its own decree and then modified only
one small portion of that decree.

Any modification was

proper.
Under well-established guidelines, this Court is not in
a position to disturb the lower court ruling.

There was no

abuse of discretion, no unfairness and no inequitable
treatment of the defendant.

The defendant bargained for a

division of his pension as property of the parties and now
desires to be relieved of that bargain.

The initial

settlement and decree were fair and equitable to both
parties, and should stand as interpreted by the Trial Court.

DATED this

zx

day of

C^ /t9hz////Z&r/Sn

1987.

Respectfully submitted,
BUNDERSON & BARON

Jon^J. Bunderson
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
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